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Abstract—We analyze the problem of downlink resource allo-
cation in a non-cooperative multi-level tree topology structured
wireless mesh network in which a selﬁsh mesh router (MR)
may refuse to relay other MRs’ trafﬁc so as to improve its
own performance at the cost of overall system performance.
Based on game theory, we propose an auction framework,
where the parent MR serves as the auctioneer while its children
MRs act as bidders and compete for time-slots. We derive a
payment function from radio resource used for relaying trafﬁc
instead of money, so as to simplify the implementation and
avoid the possible security problems from monetary payment.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
and propose a stochastic best response updating algorithm to
allow the bids to iteratively converge to NE in a practical
distributed fashion. Simulation results show the proposed
auction algorithm greatly outperforms traditional algorithms
in non-cooperative environments.
Keywords-Wireless mesh networks, resource allocation, auc-
tion algorithms, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the capability of providing universal Internet access
services at affordable monetary and infrastructure costs,
infrastructure wireless mesh network (WMN) has become
one of the key topologies for future wireless networking
[1], [18]. In a typical WMN, mesh routers (MRs) form the
backbone of the network to provide wireless access for mesh
clients (MCs). A special MR, i.e., the gateway (GW), is
installed between the mesh backbone and the Internet to
provide broadband out-bound access. In WMNs, wireless
resource is usually scheduled in a centralized manner [4],
that is, the GW serves as a cluster head and determines to
resource allocated to each MRs. This centralized approach
tend to organize all MRs in a tree structure rooted at the
GW. Consequently, to provide broadband Internet services
to a remote area, the MRs close to the GW shall work as
relay nodes transmitting trafﬁc between the Internet and the
MRs far away from the GW.
Among contemporary wireless technologies, IEEE 802.16
standard has been regarded as a promising solution for
WMNs due to its capacity of combating channel fading and
supporting high data rate. The research and deployment of
IEEE 802.16-based WMNs have gained enormous popular-
ity recently [14]. However, one of the key enabling features
behind such an infrastructure WMN is that a MR should not
only serve the MCs in its own local cell, but also relay trafﬁc
for outer level MRs. Unfortunately, this kind of cooperation
among MRs is not always practical in reality, especially
when these MRs are owned by different proﬁt-maximizing
entities. In such a non-cooperative environment, a MR will
rationally exhibit selﬁsh behaviors driven by self-interests in
that the MR may report a bogus channel information or valu-
ation so as to improve its own beneﬁt [11], or refuse to relay
other MRs’ trafﬁc because relaying trafﬁc will inevitably
consume its own resource and consequently degrade its own
performance. This selﬁsh problem is further complicated in
a multi-level tree topology WMN environment, where the
centralized scheduler at the GW can only impose limited
loose control over the distributed remote MRs. Though these
non-cooperative behaviors could improve the performance
for the selﬁsh MR itself, they may lead to inefﬁcient or
unfair resource utilization from the system perspective.
Several recent work has addressed the problem of resource
allocation in WMNs. In [4], the authors studied the op-
portunistic scheduling in an IEEE 802.16j based WiMAX
relay networks so as to serve the mobiles in a fair manner
and improve the throughput and increase range of WMN
effectively. But they didn’t take the selﬁsh behavior of mesh
routers into account. In [5], the problem of joint routing and
scheduling in 802.16 based mesh networks was investigated
and an ILP optimization model was proposed to determine
a minimum schedule period and maximize the spectrum
spatial reuse. While in [3], a joint power-frequency-time
resource allocation algorithm was designed to optimize the
system performance of a clustered WMN. But these two
studies were both based on global optimization, and the
competition among different MRs was not considered. In
[14], a radio resource management framework for scheduling
and admission control in an IEEE 802.16-based WMN was
proposed to maximize transmission rate as well as satisfy
QoS requirements under power constraint in a wireless MR.
It just provided a study of the performance of an individual
router; overall system performance was not analyzed. In
[17], the throughput maximization problems in a WMN for
both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios were ana-
lyzed, and a linear pricing scheme was proposed to combat
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the selﬁsh behavior of non-cooperative MRs. However, the
strategy to relay trafﬁc was not considered. In [7], two
auction-based approaches were proposed to help relay nodes
to determine how to allocate transmission power among
users as well as improve fairness and efﬁciency perfor-
mances. In their model a relay node itself does not have
local users to serve, which is different with our model where
a relay MR should serve both local and relay connections.
In this paper, we design a novel auction-based resource
allocation scheme. In this scheme, the whole WMN is
divided into multiple auction sub-markets. Each sub-market
comprises of a parent MR and its children MRs. The
parent MR serves as the auctioneer, who has trafﬁc for its
children and grandchildren MRs, while the children MRs
act as bidders and compete with each other for the time-
slots from their parent. Within this model, we propose a
relay auction (RA) algorithm based on a concave utility
function, where a MR’s bid is a scalar directly associated
with its reported valuation, and the payment is proportional
to this bid. Though in some auction algorithms [7], [19], the
payments are expressed in terms of money, they cannot be
easily implemented in practice and may suffer from security
problems. In this paper, one of our major contributions is
that we associate the payment with the time-slots used by
a MR to relay others’ trafﬁc. Speciﬁcally, to win time-
slots allocated by the auctioneer, a bidder must “pay” some
wireless resources, i.e., time-slots, and use them to forward
its children’s trafﬁc. We prove the existence and uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium (NE) [15] for the bidding proﬁle. We
also present a stochastic bid update algorithm to achieve
NE in a practical situation and prove its convergence. The
simulation show that the proposed RA algorithm greatly
outperforms traditional algorithms in non-cooperative en-
vironments, while having the capability of balancing the
efﬁciency and fairness by adjusting the payment function
parameter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present
the system model and auction framework in Section II. In
Section III, our novel relay auction approach is proposed.
Section IV gives the simulation results. We conclude in
Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider an IEEE 802.16-based WMN
with tree topology and focus on downlink resource alloca-
tion. Such a hierarchical network structure is highly practical
and can be used to model a WMN in a rural area [4]. We
assume the tree structure has been already determined using
link metrics such as Expected Transmission Time (ETT)
[16]. The proposed WMN model is represented by a tree
graph G = (V,E). Here, V is a set of MRs in the WMN,
and E is a set of edges between every parent and child
MR, i.e., the wireless links on the routing tree. There are
|V | = N + 1 MRs in the tree, where N is the number of
MRs other than the GW. The tree’s maximal level is L, and
the root GW is at level 0. Speciﬁcally, a MR i ∈ V is at
level l if it is l hops away from the GW, and the edge e(i)
between node i and its parent MR Pi is also at level l.
We assume every cell centered on a MR operates under
IEEE 802.16 OFDM/TDMA-TDD mode, and each adjacent
cell uses a different frequency band. Except the MRs at the
farmost level L, every MR has both local MC connections
served in its local cell and relay connections for its children
MRs. The MAC frame is composed of downlink and uplink
subframes. Each downlink subframe is composed of Td time-
slots, each of which is used for transmission of packets
corresponding to one connection. For uplink and downlink
transmission using OFDM, each MR uses M subchannels
with total bandwidth of B MHz. Without loss of generality,
we show in Fig. 1 a part of tree graph which consists of the
MR i at level l, its parent Pi at level l−1, its siblings j ∈ Si
with the same parent, and its children MRs Ci at level l+1.
Si is the set of i’s siblings, Ni is the number of MRs in
Si. For the sake of ease, we also let i ∈ Si. For MR i, aLi
and aRi are the average number of local packets and relay
packets that can be successfully transmitted to its local cell
and its children MRs per time-slot, respectively. They can
be measured according to channel and trafﬁc conditions.
Figure 1: Tree model.
To implement auction, we ﬁrst divide the WMN into
several sub-markets. A sub-market is made up of a MR,
its siblings and their parent. For example, in Fig. 1, the MR
i’s siblings Si and their parent Pi form a sub-market Ψi,
where each MR i acts as bidder and competes for time-slots
from the auctioneer Pi through auction. Each sub-market can
operate independently and locally. To be noticed, because the
outmost MRs at level Y do not have relay connections, they
are not organized into auction sub-markets and we assume
they get resources through their parents’ scheduling.
In our model, we assume if receiving ti time-slots per
frame, MR i’s valuation is V Li (a
L
i , ti), thus its valuation
function can be fully characterized by the scalar parameter
aLi . Further, as in [9], we consider to use the following
logarithmic function to express MR i’s valuation on its
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received resource, i.e.,
V Li (a
L
i , t) = N
L
i · log(
aLi
NLi
· t+ 1), (1)
where NLi is the number of MCs served by MR i. Thus,
V Li (a
L
i , t) also represents MR i’s local valuation when it
serves NLi local MCs. Similarly, we let V
R
i (a
R
i , t) be MR
i’s relay valuation, i.e,
V Ri (a
R
i , t) = N
R
i · log(
aRi
NRi
· t+ 1), (2)
whereNRi is the number of its relay connections. We assume
that Pi has already obtained aRi during the process of routing
tree construction. It can also know NRi and N
L
i according
to the buffered trafﬁc.
In an auction, a succinct and expressive bidding language
related to bidders’ valuation is necessary. According to (1),
a bidders valuation function on the allocated resource is
actually fully characterized by a single scalar parameter
aLi . Because a
L
i is only related to MR i’s local downlink
transmission and is not used for WMN tree construction, the
auctioneer doesn’t know it before auction. Thus, this scalar
aLi can be utilized as bidding language and submitted to the
auctioneer to represent bidder’s valuation, then it leads to an
efﬁcient and practical bidding process.
Speciﬁcally, during the auction, every bidder i calculates
the valuation parameter aLi and submits a bid bi = μi(a
L1
i )
to the auctioneer according to a rationally selﬁsh strat-
egy. After receiving the announced bidding proﬁle B =
{b1, b2, . . . , bNi} from its children, the parent Pi knows each
bidder’s reported valuation, and then calculates the allocation
T = T (B) = {T1, T2, . . . , Ti, . . . , TNi}, which represents
the number of time-slots allocated to each bidder, as well as
the payment TR = TR(B) = {TR1 , TR2 , . . . , TRi , . . . , TRNi}
representing the number of time-slots that should be used
by MR i to relay its descendant MRs’ trafﬁc. Subsequently,
the allocation and payment results are transmitted to each
bidder. Then, each MR i gets to know TLi = Ti − TRi and
payment TRi .
In a typical auction, the utility of a bidder is the value
received by this bidder minus the payment assigned by
the auctioneer. However, in our model, to provide practical
meanings for payment, we associate the payment with the
practical radio resource, i.e., time-slots. Thus, when MR i
receives Ti time-slots and accept TRi time-slots as payment,
its utility for serving local connections is its true valuation
when getting TLi = Ti − TRi time-slots, i.e.,
ULi (a
L
i , a
R
i , Ti, T
R
i )
=V Li (a
L
i , Ti − TRi )− ci · (aLi · (Ti − TRi ) + aRi · TRi ),
(3)
where the second item of (3) is the cost of packet trans-
mission, such as power consumption and so on. ci is the
average cost per packet for MR i. On the other hand, its
relay connections can get a net beneﬁt of
URi (a
R
i , T
R
i ) = V
R
i (a
R
i , T
R
i ). (4)
III. RELAY AUCTION
One well known auction is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auction, which has been regarded as one of the most
effective mechanisms to induce truth-revealing strategies
[12]. However, the VCG auction does not consider fairness
performance. Furthermore, it just applies to the problem
where bidders have a quasilinear utility function [2]. From
(3), we see the utility function cannot be expressed as the
difference between the valuation and payment, implying that
they are not quasi-linear. Thus, the VCG method cannot
be applied here. We need to propose another new auction
approach.
Generally, the auctioneer wants to maximize the aggregate
utility of it transmitted packets. At the same time, it also
need to enforce the bidder to relay other’s trafﬁc through
payments. Speciﬁcally, the more resource a bidder requests,
the higher payment it should pay to the auctioneer. Thus, we
deﬁne the payment as a function increasing with the bidding
scalar bi, and propose a relay auction (RA) algorithm in sub-
market, which is formalized as follows.
A. Auctioning Mechanism
1) Bidding rule: In a sub-market Ψi, bidder i submits
a scalar value bi to its parent Pi, and let b = {bi :
bmin ≤ bi ≤ bmax}.
2) Payment rule: If bidder i gets Ti time-slots, it must
use TRi = f(bi) · Ti time-slots for relaying its chil-
dren’s trafﬁc, where f(bi) is increasing with bi, and
0 ≤ f(bi) ≤ 1. Here, we consider a linear payment
function: f(bi) = biA , where A is a payment parameter
and A > bmax.
This payment scheme has two implications. First, it
can restrict bidder’s selﬁsh behavior due to the fact that
when given a payment parameter A, larger resource
request means more obtained time slots should be
used for relay. Thus, a rational bidder must request
resource strategically. On the other hand, for a ﬁxed
bid, a larger A implies that larger portion of resource
can be used for local trafﬁc; while more resource are
utilized for relay connection in terms of a smaller A.
Therefore, it can adjust the tradeoff between efﬁciency
and fairness in the system, which is further veriﬁed
through simulations in Section IV.
3) Allocation rule: We assume the auctioneer’s objective
is to maximize the aggregate utilities of all local
connections and relay connections in its sub-market,
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i.e.,
T∗ = {T ∗1 , T ∗2 , · · · , T ∗N}
= argmax
{Ti}
∑
i∈Si
ULi (Ti − TRi ) + URi (TRi )
= argmax
{Ti}
∑
i∈Si
(NLi · log(
bi
NLi
· (Ti − TRi ) + 1)
+NRi · log(
aRi
NRi
· TRi + 1)
− ci · (bi · (Ti − TRi ) + aRi · TRi ))
(5)
subject to
(I)
∑
i
(TLi + T
R
i ) = Td
(II) TRi = f(bi) · Ti.
where the constraint (I) implies the time-slots constraint in
one frame, and the constraint (II) is the payment function.
B. Nash Equilibrium
When the bidder i and its siblings compete with each
other in a sub-market Ψi, our proposed relay auction can
be formulated as a strategic non-cooperative game with Ni
players, i.e., Γ  [Si, {bi}i∈Si , {ULi (B)}i∈Si ], where Si is
the player set, {b1, · · · , bNi} is the action proﬁle, and ULi
is the utility function of player i.
A useful solution concept of such a game is called a Nash
equilibrium (NE) [15], which is a bidding proﬁle B∗ where
no MR wants to deviate unilaterally, i.e.,
ULi (b
∗
i ; b
∗
−i) ≥ ULi (bi; b∗−i), ∀i ∈ Si, ∀bi ≥ 0, (6)
where b−i is the bidding proﬁle of bidder i’s opponents. We
ﬁrst establish the existence of the NE.
Theorem 1. In Ψi, there exists a bidding proﬁle B∗ =
{b∗1, · · · , b∗Ni} to achieve Nash equilibrium in the relay
auction.
Proof: A Nash equilibrium B∗ exists in the game if the
following two conditions are satisﬁed for all i ∈ Si:
1) the bidding strategy bi is a nonempty, convex and
compact subset of some Euclidean space N ; and
2) ULi (B) is continuous in B and quasi-concave in bi
The ﬁrst condition is easily satisﬁed because we have bi ∈
[bmin, bmax]. For utility function ULi , because
∂2ULi
∂b2i
< 0,
it is strictly concave on bi. As a concave function is also
quasi-concave, the second condition is then satisﬁed. Thus,
the existence of NE is proven.
We then construct MR i’s best response function (for ﬁxed
b−i) as:
βi(b−i) = {bi | bi = arg max
˜bi≥0,i∈Si
ULi (b˜i; b−i)}. (7)
Then, similar to the proof in [6], we show the uniqueness
of NE in the following.
Theorem 2. In Ψi, there exists a unique NE B∗ =
{b∗1, · · · , b∗Ni} in the relay auction.
Proof: We assume that NE is not unique, and there
exists at least another one B˜ = {b˜1, · · · , b˜N1}, and B∗ = B˜.
According to the deﬁnitions of NE and the best response
function, if given b−i, b∗i and b˜i must satisfy:
b∗i = maxb∗i U
L
i (b
∗
i , b−i), (8)
b˜i = maxb˜iU
L
i (b˜i, b−i). (9)
However, because ULi is concave and differentiable, for a
ﬁxed b−i, there is a unique best strategy bi that satisﬁes
bi = maxbiU
L
i (bi, b−i). These contradict the assumption
that B∗ = B˜. Thus, B∗ = B˜, and there is a unique NE in
this auction sub-market.
C. Iterative Best Response Update Algorithm to Achieve NE
In our model, it is difﬁcult to get the close-form βi(b−i)
and ULi (bi, b−i). However, because the nonlinear con-
strained optimization problem deﬁned by (5) can be ef-
ﬁciently solved by numerical methods, and there exists a
unique NE in the auction, and MR i’s utility function ULi in
(3) is differentiable and concave related to bi, we can still
design an stochastic bid updating algorithm to achieve NE
based on each bidder’s local information and the limited
feedback received from the auctioneer. Although it is still
hard to obtain the exact expression of ULi (bi,b−i), we can
regard the optimization problem to ﬁnd the best response in
(7) as a stochastic approximation problem [13], and then
get recursive solutions for the best response through the
stochastic gradient form of Robbin-Monro algorithm [13]
and the ﬁnite difference (FD) method. The key idea is to let
the auctioneer gives the bidders some additional information
besides the auction results so that the bidder can use it to
estimate the gradient of its utility by FD method and then
update its bid according to Robbin-Monro algorithm.
Speciﬁcally, at time t, when the auctioneer Pi receives b
and calculates the allocation T (b) and payment TR(b), it
also calculates TL+i = T
L
i (b + ct · ei) and TL−i = TLi (b −
ct · ei). Here, ct → 0 is a FD interval and ei be the standard
unit vector in the ith coordinate direction. Then they are all
sent to bidder i. With this knowledge, MR i can estimate
its utility gradient ∇bi(t)Ui(bi(t), b−i(t)) by FD method as
follows:
∇bi(t)Ui(b) =
ULi (b + ct · ei)− ULi (b− ct · ei)
2ct
=
ULi (T
L+
i )− ULi (TL−i )
2ct
.
(10)
It further apply Robbin-Monro algorithm to update the
best response by
bi(t+ 1) = bi(t) + at · ∇bi(t)Ui(b), (11)
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where the gain sequence at > 0, at → 0,Σ∞t=o(at) = ∞.
Then bidder i submits bid bi(t + 1) again at time t + 1.
We let the bids update asynchronously, e.g., the auctioneer
Pi only calculates bidder i’s additional information at time
{i, i + Ni, i + 2Ni, · · · }. Then the NE can be achieved
gradually. The stochastic best response update algorithms
for the auctioneer and the bidders are formalized as follows
in Algorithm 1, and Algorithm 2, respectively.
Algorithm 1 The stochastic best response update algorithm
for the auctioneer
1: In sub-market Ψi, at time t, the auctioneer Pi receives
bidding proﬁle b from all children i ∈ Si;
2: Calculates Ti and TRi for every bidder i ∈ Si;
3: j = (t mod Ni) + 1;
4: Calculates TL+j , T
L−
j
5: Sends Ti and TRi to every bidder i ∈ Si; and sends
TL+j , T
L−
j and ct to bidder j.
Algorithm 2 The stochastic best response update algorithm
for bidders
1: Initialization: At time t = 0, every bidder i ∈ Si
randomly submits a bid bi(0) ∈ [bmin, bmax];
2: while t = 1, 2, · · · do
3: if i = (t mod Ni) + 1 then
4: bi(t+ 1) = bi(t);
5: else
6: Bidder i receives Ti, TRi , T
L+
i , T
L−
i and ct;
7: Bidder i approximates the gradient of its utility by
(10) and update its bid according to Robbin-Monro
algorithm by (11);
8: end if
9: Submit bi(t+ 1);
10: end while
Theorem 3. For each bidder i ∈ Ψi, under any initial
condition b(0), the sequence {b(t)} converges weakly (i.e.,
in probability) to NE B∗.
Proof: We ﬁrst interpolate the iterates b(t) into a
continuous time interpolation process bt(t) = {bti (t)} with
interpolation intervals t, and deﬁne bi(t) as follows:
b
t
i (t) =
{
bi(0) t < 0
bi(n) nt − i ≤ t ≤ ni, n = 1, 2, · · · .
(12)
Thus, as shown in [13], when t → 0, bti (t) converges in
trajectory to bi(t). Here, bi(t) is the solution of the ordinary
differential equation (ODE) function
dbi(t)
dt
= ∇bi(t)Ui(bi(t), b−i(t)). (13)
Because Ui(bi(t), b−i(t)) is bounded and quasi-concave
with respect to bi, the ODE in (13) is asymptotically
Liapunov stable. Consequently, as t → 0, the sequence
bi(t) converges weakly to an optimizer of its utility function,
i.e.,Nash equilibrium b∗i .
The convergence of the stochastic bid update algorithm
is also veriﬁed from Fig. 2, where aL1 = 10, a
L
2 = 9, and
A = 90. We can see the bids converge to NE eventually.
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Figure 2: Convergence of bids to NE.
IV. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the auction
algorithm through simulations. In the simulated tree topolgy
WMN, we assume each MR has 64 subcarriers with a
total frequency band of 10 MHz. The frequency bands for
adjacent MRs are non-coverlapping and frequency reuse
is utilized. The DL-subframe length is 2ms. The wireless
channel is modeled as six-path frequency-selective Rayleigh
slow fading channel; each path is simulated by Clark’s
fading model and suffers from different Rayleigh fading
with the maximum Doppler frequency of 30 Hz. Because
the coherence time 33.3ms is much larger than the DL-
subframe length, the channel condition can be regarded as
static during the iterative bidding period to achieve NE.
This is a realistic assumption in a WMN because the MRs
are immobile. Furthermore, we assume the average SNR is
identical for all MCs in a cell. Like [4], we do not model
packet arrival process at the GW and MRs, and assume the
GW has inﬁnite backlogged trafﬁc for each MC in WMN
and the downlink mesh tree is constructed by using routing
algorithms, such as ETT by [16]. We assume each parent MR
has at most 3 children, and there are 10 MCs in each cell.
Then the trafﬁcs generated at GW can be transmitted across
the WMN and reach MCs through other MR’s relay. bmin
and bmax are 1 and 20, respectively, which also represent
the minimum and the maximum successfully transmittable
packets per time slots.
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We ﬁrst compare our proposed RA algorithm with two
traditional cooperative resource allocation methods, i.e.,
proportional fairness (PF) [10], and a global optimization
method (GLB) which maximizes the aggregate utilities of
all MRs based on centralized scheduling, in non-cooperative
environments. In this setting, the maximal tree level L is
from 2 to 5, and the payment parameter A is 90. Notice
that in a cooperative situation which is unrealistic in the
operating environment considered in this paper, all MRs
report their true valuations to their parents and relay other’s
trafﬁc according to scheduling results. However, in a non-
cooperative environment, a selﬁsh MR may report a bogus
valuation parameter to increase its own local beneﬁt without
regard to the overall system performance [11] and relay less
trafﬁc to others. In our simulations, we assume in each
sub-market, there is a MR who always reports a higher
valuation in the case of using PF and GLB algorithms.
From Fig. 3, we ﬁrst notice that the average throughput per
MR decreases with the size of WMN, due to the downlink
transmission capacity limit of the GW. Another reason is
that more packets may be dropped due to increased wireless
transmission error along the longer path when the network
expands. Furthermore, the average throughput per MR of PF
and GLB are both much lower than that of RA algorithm due
to the fact that less trafﬁcs are relayed to remote MRs. While
in RA algorithm, a selﬁsh MR may not beneﬁt from bidding
higher value because this will also incur higher payment.
Consequently, the system performance is maintained in NE
state during auctions.
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Figure 3: Average throughput per MR with the change of
network size in non-cooperative situations.
We then illustrate the throughput and fairness perfor-
mances of RA in terms of payment parameter, where the
maximal tree level L is 2, and compare them with the
performances of GLB and PF in cooperative situations. In
Fig. 4, we notice that the average throughput per MR of
RA algorithm increases with the payment parameter A.
Although GLB and PF generate higher throughput than RA
algorithm, the throughput of RA achieves almost 95% of
that for GLB with the increase of payment parameter, e.g.,
A > 100, even in non-cooperative environments. This is
because the time-slots used for relay will decrease if the
payment parameter becomes larger, then more resources are
utilized to server local MCs’ trafﬁc. Because local MCs are
usually closer to the MR and generally experience better
transmission conditions than relay connections, the overall
system throughput increases when more resources are used
for local trafﬁc. We then investigate the fairness performance
in terms of Jain fairness index [8]. We can see in Fig. 5 that
the Jain fairness index for RA algorithm is dependent on the
payment parameter A. RA achieves its highest index value
0.735 when A = 122, which is about 95% of PF’s fairness
index value. Thus, the proposed RA algorithm can be used to
strike a proper balance between efﬁciency and fairness by
adjusting payment function parameter. Furthermore, when
utilizing RA algorithm in non-cooperative environments, the
efﬁciency and fairness performances are comparable with
those obtained by GLB and PF in operative situations.
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Figure 4: Average throughput per MR with the change of
payment parameter.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the downlink resource allocation
problem in a non-cooperative IEEE 802.16 tree topology
based wireless mesh network. To motivate selﬁsh MRs to
relay other’s trafﬁc, we divide the entire network into multi-
ple auction sub-markets and design an auction framework
to let rationally selﬁsh MRs compete with their siblings
for time-slots from their parent. Based on it, we further
propose a novel relay auction algorithm, where the payment
is designed as the time-slots used for relaying trafﬁc instead
of money, and the allocation policy is to maximize both
local and relay connections’ utilities in the sub-market.
After proving the existence and uniqueness of NE, we also
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Figure 5: Jain fairness index with the change of payment
parameter.
propose a stochastic best response update algorithm to allow
bidders to iteratively update their bids based on their local
information and the limited feedback from the auctioneer
and prove its convergence to NE. We then compare the per-
formances of the RA algorithm with traditional GLB and PF
algorithms through simulations, which indicate that the RA
algorithm excels GLB and PF in non-cooperative situations.
It also can achieve competitive performance in terms of
resource allocation efﬁciency with high payment parameter
A, while demonstrating good fairness performance with
small payment parameter, so as to strike a proper balance
between efﬁciency and fairness in the network.
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